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A PROBLEM OF “VIRTUAL” PROPORTIONS: 
THE DIFFICULTIES INHERENT IN 
TAILORING VIRTUAL CHILD 
PORNOGRAPHY LAWS TO MEET 
CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS 
Jasmin J. Farhangian* 
The right to think is the beginning of freedom, and speech must be 
protected from the government because speech is the beginning of 
thought. 
—Justice Anthony Kennedy1 
It is only through computer systems and the mail that child 
pornography exists today. 
—Alabama Senator Jeff Sessions2 
                                                          
 * Brooklyn Law School Class of 2004; B.A., New York University, 2000. 
The author is grateful to her family and friends for their invaluable 
encouragement and support. She owes a special thank you to her parents for 
serving as a constant source of inspiration. 
1 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002) (noting the 
danger posed to the First Amendment when the Government “seeks to control 
thought or to justify its laws for that impermissible end”). 
2 United States Senator Jeff Sessions Press Release, (Sept. 16, 2002), 
available at http://sessions.senate.gov/headlines/child.htm (stating Alabama 
Senator Jeff Sessions’ support for the 2002 anti-child pornography bill). 
Sessions states that child pornography laws to date have been hugely successful 
in eliminating child pornography from bookstores. Id. He alludes to the fact that 
efforts should be focused on enacting legislation to serve as the basis for 
prosecuting individuals who perpetuate child pornography on the Internet. See 
id. 
FARHANGIAN.DOC 3/3/2004  1:45 PM 
242 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
INTRODUCTION 
A defendant stands before the court to challenge his conviction 
for possession of child pornography.3 The government points to 
images of child pornography found on the defendant’s computer 
hard drive. The defendant asserts that this evidence should not 
form the basis for a conviction since the images do not depict real 
children at all. Rather, he asserts that the images are computer 
generated. Furthermore, he insists that the government prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the images are real. 
Concern by the United States Government over the realization 
of this exact scenario helped form the basis for proposed 
legislation titled the Child Obscenity and Pornography Prevention 
Act of 2002 (COPPA of 2002)4 and the Child Obscenity and 
Pornography Prevention Act of 2003 (COPPA of 2003).5 The 
COPPA of 2002 and 2003 were never enacted into law but the 
Senate ultimately incorporated the virtual child pornography 
prohibitions contained in the COPPA of 2002 and 2003 into the 
Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of 
                                                          
3 See infra note 51 (citing numerous state statutes which criminalize child 
pornography). See also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 773 (1982) (finding 
that New York state statute prohibiting the dissemination of child pornography 
was not substantially overbroad and did not violate the First Amendment). 
4 H.R. 4623, 107th Cong. (2d Sess. 2002) (entitled, “An act to prevent 
trafficking in child pornography and obscenity, to proscribe pandering and 
solicitation relating to visual depictions of minors engaging in sexually explicit 
conduct, to prevent the use of child pornography and obscenity to facilitate 
crimes against children, and for other purposes”). The bill was passed by the 
House in June 2002 and referred to the Senate on June 26, 2002. See id. The 
COPPA of 2002 was struck down in the Senate in February 2003. See id. 
Following its demise in the Senate, the House proposed the Child Obscenity and 
Pornography Prevention Act of 2003. See H.R. 1161, 108th Cong. (2003). 
5 H.R. 1161, 108th Cong. (2003). The 2003 bill retains the same title as the 
COPPA of 2002, namely, “An act to prevent trafficking in child pornography 
and obscenity, to proscribe pandering and solicitation relating to visual 
depictions of minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct, to prevent the use of 
child pornography and obscenity to facilitate crimes against children, and for 
other purposes.” Id. 
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Children Today Act (PROTECT Act),6 which was signed into law 
by President Bush on April 30, 2003.7 
The COPPA of 2002 and 2003 and the PROTECT Act were a 
direct response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. Free 
Speech Coalition,8 in which the Court held unconstitutional two 
provisions of the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 
(CPPA), one of which placed a ban on “virtual” child 
pornography.9 The legislation, proposed by Attorney General John 
Ashcroft, attempted to rectify the problems with the CPPA by 
tailoring virtual child pornography laws to meet constitutional 
standards.10 Congressman Lamar Smith of Texas, the bill’s 
sponsor, stated that Congress tried to respond to the specific 
objections voiced by the individual Supreme Court justices in 
Ashcroft and that he was confident that the COPPA of 2002 would 
                                                          
6 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2003); S. 151, 108th Cong. (1st Sess. 2003) (titled, “A 
Bill to Amend Title 18, United States Code, With Respect to the Sexual 
Exploitation of Children”). 
7 See Joseph J. Beard, Virtual Kiddie Porn: A Real Crime? An Analysis of 
the Protect Act, 21-SUM ENT. & SPORTS LAW 3, 4 (2003) (stating that 
differences between the COPPA and the Senate version of this bill led to the 
enactment of the PROTECT Act). 
8 535 U.S. 234 (2002). 
9 See 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(A)-(C) (2003). The CPPA defines “child 
pornography” as: 
any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or 
computer or computer-generated image or picture, whether made or 
produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means, of sexually 
explicit conduct, where: (A) the production of such visual depiction 
involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; (B) 
such visual depiction is a digital image, computer image, or computer- 
generated image that is, or is indistinguishable from, that of a minor 
engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or (C) such visual depiction has 
been created, adapted, or modified to appear that an identifiable minor 
is engaging in sexually explicit conduct. 
Id. The second provision, which all nine justices agreed violates the First 
Amendment, proscribes visual depictions which “convey the impression” that 
the material is or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually 
explicit conduct. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 257-88 
(2002). 
10 See H.R. 4623, 107th Cong. (2d Sess. 2002). 
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pass constitutional muster.11 Congressman Smith felt equally 
strong about the constitutionality of the COPPA of 2003, which he 
also sponsored.12 
This note addresses the constitutionality of the recent attempts 
to proscribe virtual child pornography, particularly as they face 
first amendment challenges the CPPA failed to survive. Part I 
describes virtual child pornography and discusses the development 
of virtual child pornography law. Part II discusses the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Ashcroft, focusing on the government’s reasons 
for asserting the necessity of a ban on virtual child pornography. 
Part III explores the ways in which legislation proscribing virtual 
child pornography responds to the government’s concerns and 
introduces the newly-passed ban on virtual child pornography in 
the PROTECT Act. Part IV argues that any attempt to ban virtual 
child pornography will prove unsuccessful against a First 
Amendment challenge. Part V proposes that the government focus 
its resources on prosecuting offenders of child pornography who 
utilize technology to create computer-generated images of children 
rather than on attempting to pass constitutionally faulty legislation. 
I.  THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 
LAW 
It is well established that the First Amendment does not protect 
pornography that involves real children.13 Because child 
                                                          
11 Julia Scheeres, House Refines Virtual Porn Ban, WIRED NEWS, (Jun. 27, 
2002), available at http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,53510, 00.htm. 
12 See Congressman Lamar Smith Press Release, Smith Bill to Fight Child 
Pornography Passes House, (Apr. 10, 2003), available at http://lamarsmith. 
house.gov/news.asp?FormMode=Detail&ID=210. “If this legislation becomes 
law, child pornographers will be deterred, or prosecuted.” Id. 
13 See U.S. CONST. Amend. I. The First Amendment states, in pertinent 
part, “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press . . . .” Id. Although the First Amendment was originally construed to 
protect political and social speech, the Court has consistently held that the First 
Amendment also protects artistic and other types of speech, even if of a sexual 
nature. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981) 
(holding that nude dancing, as a form of expression, is within the purview of 
protected free speech); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 
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pornography is not entitled to constitutional protection, legislation 
that proscribes its creation, possession and distribution is 
permissible.14 Virtual child pornography, however, creates a 
unique problem in that it involves the creation of pornography 
without the use of actual, live children.15 Computers have 
transformed the creation of child pornography into a realm not 
covered by existing law.16 
A technique known as “morphing” allows a non-obscene 
image, such as a photograph of a real child scanned into a 
computer, to be transformed into an image of a child engaging in 
sexually explicit conduct.17 Morphing, short for 
“metamorphosing,” is a technique through which a computer fills 
in the blanks between dissimilar objects to create a combined 
image.18 For example, through graphics software, an individual can 
combine the image of a child’s face with that of an adult’s body, 
erase pubic hair and reduce breast or genital size to create a portrait 
                                                          
(1952) (holding that motion pictures, despite being made for commercial 
motives, are protected by the First Amendment); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 
507, 510 (1948) (holding that the distinction between informative speech and 
speech for entertainment purposes is “too elusive” to deny entertaining 
expression constitutional protection); see also Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 
109-10 (1990) (allowing states to penalize persons possessing and viewing child 
pornography); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756 (1982) (providing that 
child pornography is not entitled to First Amendment protection so long as the 
prohibited conduct is adequately defined by state law). 
14 See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761 (holding that the state has an interest in 
prohibiting images that are the product of child sexual abuse, regardless of their 
content). 
15 See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002) 
(distinguishing real child pornography from virtual child pornography and 
explaining why prohibitions on the latter presents a First Amendment problem). 
16 See Debra D. Burke, The Criminalization of Virtual Child Pornography: 
A Constitutional Question, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 439 (1997) (describing 
techniques utilized to create virtual child pornography). Advancements in 
technology, specifically through the use of computers, allow for individuals to 
create visual images that do not consist of images of minors. Id. 
17 Id. at 440-41. 
18 Id. at 440 n.5. See Jeff Prosise, Morphing: Magic on Your PC, PC MAG., 
June 14, 1994, at 325 (explaining morphing technology). 
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of child pornography that appears genuine.19 In fact, this 
technology allows an individual to create a computer-generated 
child from adult pornography images.20 The image of a Playboy 
centerfold can be scanned into a computer at very little expense 
and then altered through the use of morphing technology to create 
a visual depiction that appears to be of a nude child.21 
Virtual child pornography falls outside the parameters of 
existing child pornography law because it functions through the 
use of artistic and computer skills to create animated depictions 
resembling real children.22 The law with respect to child 
pornography has undergone many changes to meet the continuing 
challenges of child pornography itself.23 In reviewing real child 
pornography laws, the Supreme Court has clearly stated that real 
child pornography does not warrant First Amendment protection.24 
The Court recently had the opportunity to address the 
constitutionality of prohibitions on virtual child pornography and, 
despite its declaration that such prohibitions violate the First 
Amendment, the legislature continues to enact proscriptions 
against virtual child pornography.25 
A.  The Supreme Court 
From the early 1970s the Supreme Court has struggled with 
                                                          
19 Burke, supra note 16, at 472 n.8. 
20 Id. at 440. 
21 Id. 
22 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765 (1982) (stating that materials 
or depictions of sexual conduct “which do not involve live performance or 
photographic or other visual reproduction of live performances,” retain First 
Amendment protection); Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1092-
93 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining that virtually-created child pornography cannot be 
suppressed simply because it involves “foul figments of creative technology” 
that do not involve actual children). 
23 See supra Part I.B (discussing early legislation and amendments to deal 
with the widespread problem of child pornography). 
24 See supra Part I.A (detailing the Supreme Court’s holdings when 
analyzing  real child pornography laws). 
25 S. 151, 108th Cong. (1st Sess. 2003); H.R. 1161, 108th Cong. (2003); 
H.R. 4623, 107th Cong. (2d Sess. 2002). 
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defining permissible limitations on pornography.26 In Miller v. 
California, the Supreme Court provided examples of visual images 
that states may incorporate into statutes when defining obscenity.27 
For example, a state could regulate “patently offensive 
representations or descriptions of ultimate sex acts, normal or 
perverted, actual or simulated, or patently offensive representations 
or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, or lewd 
exhibition of genitals.”28 
Almost ten years later, in New York v. Ferber, the Supreme 
Court expanded the scope of the states’ freedom to suppress 
material portraying sexual acts or lewd displays of genitalia of 
children.29 The Ferber Court ultimately held that the First 
Amendment does not extend protection to persons who sell, 
                                                          
26 See, e.g., Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S.103 (1990); Ferber, 458 U.S. 747; 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
27 413 U.S. 15, 25-26 (1973). The defendant in Miller conducted a mass 
mailing campaign to advertise the sale of illustrated books categorized as “adult 
material.” Id. at 16. His conviction was specifically based on his conduct in 
causing five unsolicited advertising brochures to be sent through the mail 
addressed to a restaurant in Newport Beach, California. Id. The envelope was 
opened by the manager of the restaurant and his mother who did not request the 
brochures and who subsequently complained to the police. Id. Defendant was 
convicted by a jury for violating California Penal Code section 311.2(a) by 
knowingly distributing obscene matter. Id. The Supreme Court held that obscene 
materials may properly be regulated by the state. Id. The Court defined 
obscenity as works which “taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in 
sex,” which “portray, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically 
defined by the applicable state law” and which “taken as a whole, do not have 
serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.” Id. at 24. 
28 Id. at 25. 
29 458 U.S. 747 (1982). Ferber involved a Bookstore proprietor convicted 
under a New York statute prohibiting individuals from “knowingly promoting a 
sexual performance by a child under the age of 16 by distributing material which 
depicted such a performance.” Id. He appealed his conviction and the Appellate 
Division affirmed. Id. On appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, his 
conviction was reversed based on a finding that the New York statute under 
which Ferber was convicted was both underinclusive and overbroad and, as a 
result, violated the First Amendment. 52 N.Y.2d 674 (Ct. App. 1981). The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, holding that child pornography 
is not protected by the First Amendment and that the New York statute was 
neither overbroad nor underinclusive. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 747. 
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advertise or otherwise disseminate child pornography.30 The 
Ferber Court rejected the First Amendment challenge, holding that 
“[t]he value of permitting live performances and photographic 
reproductions of children engaged in lewd sexual conduct is 
exceedingly modest, if not de minimis.”31 In the first sentence of 
the Ferber decision, the Court observed that “[i]n recent years, the 
exploitive use of children in the production of pornography has 
become a serious national problem.”32 The Court, in so expressing 
its concern over the children harmed in the production of child 
pornography, indicated that regulation of child pornography 
warranted different treatment than regulation of adult 
pornography.33 A noteworthy result of Ferber was the Court’s 
holding that all child pornography that depicted actual children 
may be prohibited, regardless of whether it was “obscene.”34 
Subsequently, in Osborne v. Ohio, the Court addressed the 
issue of whether an individual may possess child pornography 
privately in his home.35 The Court applied the standards from 
                                                          
30 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 762. 
31 Id. at 759. 
32 Id. at 749. See also S. REP. 95-438, at 43 (1977). Legislative findings in 
1977 revealed that, “because of the vast potential profits involved, it would 
appear that [the child pornography] enterprise is growing at a rapid rate.” Id. 
One researcher . . . has documented the existence of over 260 different 
magazines which depict children engaging in sexually explicit conduct. 
Such magazines depict children, some as young as three to five years of 
age, in couplings with their peers of the same or opposite sex, or with 
adult men and women. The activities featured range from lewd poses to 
intercourse, fellatio, cunnilingus, masturbation, rape, incest and sado-
masochism. Such magazines . . . are only one of the forms of child 
pornography that are currently available in the United States. Other 
forms include ten to twelve minute films known as ‘loops,’ still 
photographs, slides, playing cards and video cassettes. 
Id. 
33 See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756. 
34 Id. at 764-65. See supra note 29 (discussing the facts and holding of the 
Ferber opinion). 
35 495 U.S. 103 (1990). In Osborne, Ohio police found photographs in 
Osborne’s home, each of which depicted a nude male adolescent posed in a 
sexually explicit position. Id. Osborne was convicted of violating a state statute 
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Ferber, reasoning that the First Amendment similarly does not 
extend protection to the private possession of child pornography.36 
According to the Osborne Court, the state could prohibit the 
possession and viewing of these materials because doing so would 
further the state’s compelling interest in “protecting the physical 
and psychological well-being of minors and in destroying the 
market for the exploitative use of children.”37 
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,38 decided nearly three 
decades after the Supreme Court first addressed obscenity in 
Miller, provided the Court with its first opportunity to address 
legislation prohibiting virtual child pornography.39 The Free 
Speech Coalition and others originally challenged the CPPA of 
1996 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
                                                          
prohibiting a person from possessing or viewing any material or performance 
showing a minor (who was not his child or ward) in a state of nudity, unless the 
material was presented for a bona fide purpose by or to a person having a proper 
interest in such materials, or the possessor knew that the minor’s parents or 
guardian has consented in writing to the photographing or use of the minor. Id. 
Osborne contended that the First Amendment prohibited the States from 
proscribing the private possession of child pornography. Id. 
36 Id. at 139. 
37 Id. at 103. 
38 535 U.S. 234 (2002). In this case, the Supreme Court struck down the 
portions of the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA) which 
expanded the federal prohibition on child pornography to images that did not 
depict real children. Id. A trade association of businesses involved in the 
production and distribution of “adult-oriented materials,” and others, brought a 
pre-enforcement challenge, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from these 
“virtual” child pornography provisions of the Act, stating that the provisions 
chilled protected speech. Id. The District Court for the Northern District of 
California disagreed and granted the government’s motion for summary 
judgment. Id. The Ninth Circuit reversed and the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari. Id. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, held that 
speech prohibited by the CPPA’s ban on virtual child pornography is 
distinguishable from child pornography, which may be banned without regard to 
whether it depicts works of value. Id. It also held that the ban on virtual child 
pornography in the CPPA abridges the freedom to engage in a substantial 
amount of lawful speech, and thus is overbroad and unconstitutional under the 
First Amendment. Id. 
39 Id. 
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California, asserting that certain provisions of the statute were 
overbroad and vague, “chilling them from producing works 
protected by the First Amendment.”40 The District Court disagreed, 
granting summary judgment to the Government.41 The Court 
applied a strict scrutiny standard and held the CPPA did not burden 
any more speech than necessary to further “important and 
compelling government interests” advanced by the legislation.42 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in Free 
Speech Coalition v. Reno,43 agreeing with respondents that the 
CPPA was overbroad because it banned material that was neither 
obscene under Miller v. California, nor produced by the 
exploitation of real children as in New York v. Ferber.44 
According to the Ninth Circuit, the CPPA was unconstitutional 
on its face.45 On the other hand, four other Circuit Courts of 
Appeals sustained the CPPA.46 These courts, while agreeing that 
                                                          
40 Id. at 243. Plaintiffs in this action consisted of The Free Speech 
Coalition, a trade association that defends First Amendment rights against 
censorship, the publisher of a book “dedicated to the education and expression 
of the ideals and philosophy associated with nudism,” and individual artists 
whose work include nude and erotic photographs and paintings. Id. at 234. 
Plaintiffs filed a pre-enforcement challenge to the constitutionality of certain 
provisions of the CPPA, alleging that they are vague, overbroad, and constitute 
impermissible content-specific regulations and prior restraints on free speech. 
Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 1997 WL 487758 at *4 (N.D. Cal. 1997) 
(noting that among the government’s stated interests is the protection of children 
from sexual exploitation). The District Court further stated that any ambiguity in 
determining whether an individual depicted in an image “appears to be a minor” 
could be “resolved by examining whether the work was marketed and advertised 
as child pornography.” Id. According to a strict scrutiny analysis, a challenged 
Act must be narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests. 
United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394, 400 (5th Cir. 2001). 
43 198 F.3d 1083 (1999). 
44 Id. at 1092-97. 
45 Id. at 1096. “On its face, the CPPA prohibits material that has been 
accorded First Amendment protection. That is, non-obscene sexual expression 
that does not involve actual children is protected expression under the First 
Amendment.” Id. 
46 See United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. 
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the CPPA was a “content-based regulation,” found the Act 
survived strict scrutiny because it was narrowly tailored to meet 
the government’s compelling interest in protecting children from 
child pornography offenders and was not unconstitutionally 
overbroad or vague.47 In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari and ultimately agreed with the 
Ninth Circuit that the CPPA was overbroad and thus violated the 
First Amendment.48 
B.  Early Legislation and Amendments 
While the Supreme Court has struggled with addressing which 
prohibitions on child pornography the First Amendment allows, 
the legislature has sought to deal with the widespread problem of 
                                                          
Mento, 231 F.3d 912 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Acheson, 195 F.3d 645 
(11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Hilton 167 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. 
denied, 528 U.S. 844 (1999). The Ninth circuit cited to the First Circuit’s 
decision in United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 68-69 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. 
denied, 528 U.S. 844 (1999), for a proposition upon which it based its holding: 
[T]he First Circuit found that the Act at issue was content-based 
because it expressly aims to curb a particular category of expression, 
child pornography, by singling out the type of expression based on its 
content and then banning it. The Hilton court’s determination that 
blanket suppression of an entire type of speech is a content-
discriminating act is a legal conclusion with which we agree. The child 
pornography law is at its essence founded upon content-based 
classification of speech. 
Free Speech Coalition, 198 F.3d at 1090-91. 
47 See Fox, 248 F.3d at 406. The Court stated that, “[n]otwithstanding the 
general rule that ‘[c]ontent-based regulations are presumptively invalid’ because 
of the intolerable ‘risk of suppressing protected expression,’ the Supreme Court 
has made clear that in regulating child pornography, Congress is entitled to 
‘greater leeway’.” Id. at 400 (citing New York v. Ferber). 
48 See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 256 (2002) 
(holding “[t]he provision abridges the freedom to engage in a substantial amount 
of lawful speech. For this reason, it is overbroad and unconstitutional”). The 
Court stated that, “[e]ven if a film contains no sexually explicit scenes involving 
minors, it could be treated as child pornography if the title and trailers convey 
the impression that the scenes would be found in the movie. The determination 
turns on how the speech is presented, not on what is depicted.” Id. at 257. 
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child pornography itself.49 “Child pornography is a social concern 
that has evaded repeated attempts to stamp it out.”50 Congress and 
state legislatures have vehemently attempted to enact laws that 
would provide support for the prosecution of individuals “involved 
in the creation, distribution, and possession of sexually explicit 
materials made by or through the exploitation of children.” 51 
In 1977, the Protection of Children Against Sexual 
Exploitation Act (1977 Act) was enacted as the first federal law to 
specifically prohibit the sexual exploitation of children.52 The law 
made it illegal to use a minor to engage in sexually explicit 
conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such 
conduct.53 The creation of the 1977 Act was propelled by 
                                                          
49 See supra Part I.A (discussing the Supreme Court’s analysis of various 
pornography laws). 
50 Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1087 (1999). 
51 Id. at 1087. Numerous states have enacted criminal statutes prohibiting 
the production, promotion, sale, exhibition, or distribution of photographs of 
children engaged in sexual activity. See generally ALA. CODE § 13A-12-197 
(1996); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.455, § 11.61.125 (Michie 1995); ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 5-27-304 (Michie 1995); CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.3, § 311.11 (West 
1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-193 (1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1111 
(1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-100 (1996); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-20.1 
(West 1996); IND. CODE § 35-42-4-4 (1996); MD. CODE ANN. § 419A (1996); 
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 29A (Law. Co-op. 1996); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-
5-33 (1996); MO. REV. STAT. § 573.010 (1995); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-625 
(1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1463.03 (1996); NEV. REV. STAT. § 2A:30B-3 
(1995); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.05 (McKinney 1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
2907.322 (Anderson 1996); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.684 (1995); 18 PA. CONS. 
STAT. § 6312 (1996); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-335 (Law. Co-op. 1995); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-22-23.1 (Michie 1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-
902 (1996); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.26 (West 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 
76-5a-1 (Vernon 1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-374.1 (Michie 1996); WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. § 9.68A.070 (West 1995); WIS. STAT. § 948.12 (1994). 
52 Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, Pub. L. 
No. 95-225, 92 Stat. 7 (1997) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 
(2003)). 
53 18 U.S.C. § 2251. The Act provides, in pertinent part, that: 
(a) Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or 
coerces any minor to engage in, or who has a minor assist any other 
person to engage in, any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of 
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congressional findings that child pornography had become a highly 
organized multi-million dollar industry in which many children 
were exploited through the production of pornography.54 The 
legislation was flawed, however, in that federal law enforcement 
officials were unable to make practical use of it in prosecuting 
offenders.55 
The Attorney General’s Commission on Pornography found 
that producers of virtual child pornography primarily employed 
models that looked like minors.56 Producers of pornography, in 
order to cater to the child pornography market, often used very 
“young-looking performers” and models to give viewers the 
impression that they were actually looking at minors.57 As a result, 
distributors and producers were able to avoid prosecution simply 
                                                          
producing any visual or print medium depicting such conduct, shall be 
punished as provided under subsection (c), if such person knows or has 
reason to know that such visual or print medium will be transported in 
interstate or foreign commerce or mailed, or if such visual or print 
medium has actually been transported in interstate or foreign commerce 
or mailed. (b) Any parent, legal guardian, or person having custody or 
control of a minor who knowingly permits such minor to engage in, or 
to assist any other person to engage in, sexually explicit conduct for the 
purpose of producing any visual or print medium depicting such 
conduct shall be punished as provided under subsection (c) of this 
section, if such parent, legal guardian, or person knows or has reason to 
know that such visual or print medium will be transported in interstate 
or foreign commerce or mailed or if such visual or print medium has 
actually been transported in interstate or foreign commerce or mailed. 
(c) Any person who violates this section shall be fined not more than 
$10,000, or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both, but, if such 
person has a prior conviction under this section, such person shall be 
fined not more than $15,000, or imprisoned not less than two years nor 
more than 15 years, or both. 
Id. 
54 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 749 n.1 (1982). 
55 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMISSION ON 
PORNOGRAPHY: FINAL REPORT 596-98 (1986) [hereinafter COMMISSION 
REPORT] (detailing findings that child pornography has been used “to lure 
children to engage in sexual activity”). 
56 Id. at 618. 
57 Id. 
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by claiming ignorance or deception by the performers regarding 
their true age.58 This made it impossible, except in the most 
obvious cases, to be certain whether the performers really were 
under the age of eighteen, resulting in the hindrance of 
prosecutions of child pornography offenders.59 Consequently, the 
law has been amended several times since it was first enacted.60 
As a result of the deficiencies of the 1977 Act and the Ferber 
ruling, Congress enacted the Child Protection Act of 1984 (1984 
Act),61 which incorporated a key phrase from Ferber, stating with 
respect to the limits on the classification of child pornography, the 
“nature of the harm to be combated requires that the state offense 
be limited to works that visually depict sexual conduct.”62 The 
statute, as amended, prohibits knowingly mailing or receiving in 
the mail any visual depiction of a minor engaged in sexually 
                                                          
58 American Library Ass’n v. Reno, 33 F.3d 78, 89 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (citing 
to COMMISSION REPORT finding that ambiguity regarding a performer’s true age 
“provided an excuse to those in the distribution chain, who could profess 
ignorance that they were actually dealing in sexual materials involving 
children”). 
59 Id. at 89. 
60 See Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1087 (1999) 
(discussing deficiencies in the Protection of Children Against Sexual 
Exploitation Act). Only one person was convicted under the Act’s prohibition 
against producing pornography. Id. at 1087. In addition, the Protection of 
Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act made it a crime for a person to engage 
in the distribution for sale of any obscene materials depicting minors engaging 
in sexually explicit conduct. Pub. L. No. 95-225, § 2(a), 92 Stat. 7, 8 (1978). The 
Act defined “minor” as any person under the age of sixteen. Id. After the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Ferber, an individual could be proscribed from 
producing or distributing pornographic materials regardless of whether they 
were obscene or of value. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 753-80 (1982). 
Thus, the legislature sought to expand the law’s prohibitions by passing the 
Child Protection Act of 1984, which prohibited the distribution of material 
depicting sexual activities by children regardless of whether the visual depiction 
was “obscene.” See Maria Markova, Comment, Ashcroft v. Free Speech 
Coalition: The Constitutionality of Congressional Efforts to Ban Computer-
Generated Pornography, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 985 (2003); See also 18 U.S.C. § 
2251 (2003). 
61 Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. 204 (1984). 
62 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764. 
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explicit conduct.63 
Unlike the 1977 Act, the 1984 Act did not require that the 
trafficking, receipt, and mailing of child pornography be for the 
purposes of sale or distribution for sale.64 By eliminating the 
requirement that the production or distribution of child 
pornography be for the purpose of sale, the 1984 Act recognized 
that a great deal of trafficking in child pornography was not-for-
profit.65 Further, the 1984 Act did not require that material be 
considered obscene under the Miller obscenity standard before an 
individual could be criminally prosecuted for producing, 
disseminating or receiving such material.66 The 1984 Act increased 
                                                          
63 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2003). The amended statute provides, in pertinent 
part, that an individual is subject to punishment if he or she: 
(1) knowingly transports or ships in interstate or foreign commerce by 
any means including by computer or mails, any visual depiction, if— 
(A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor 
engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and (B) such visual depiction is 
of such conduct; (2) knowingly receives, or distributes, any visual 
depiction that has been mailed, or has been shipped or transported in 
interstate or foreign commerce, or which contains materials which have 
been mailed or so shipped or transported, by any means including by 
computer, or knowingly reproduces any visual depiction for 
distribution in interstate or foreign commerce or through the mails, if—
(A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor 
engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and (B) such visual depiction is 
of such conduct. 
Id. 
64 Id. 
65 See United States v. Andersson, 803 F.2d 903, 905-06 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(finding that Congress intended to extend coverage of the Act to those 
individuals who distributed prohibited materials without commercial motive). 
66 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Miller defined obscenity not 
protected by the First Amendment as: 
(a) whether the ‘average person, applying contemporary community 
standards’ would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the 
prurient interest [in sex]; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a 
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the 
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks 
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 
Id. See also Pub. L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. (1984). 
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the maximum fines for violation tenfold and stated that child 
pornography consisted of visual depictions of children under the 
age of eighteen whereas the previous legislation protected children 
under the age of sixteen.67 
Federal prosecutions “increased dramatically” as a result of the 
amended law,68 but the House Judiciary Committee concluded that 
the seriousness of child pornography further called for a need to 
ban advertisements related to the sexual exploitation of children as 
well as a need for greater enforcement of laws that “prohibit the 
transportation of minors for purposes of sexual exploitation.”69 As 
a result, in 1986, Congress amended the law once more, enacting 
the Child Sexual Abuse and Pornography Act of 1986, which 
banned the production and use of advertisements for child 
pornography.70 
Congress passed the Child Protection and Obscenity 
Enforcement Act of 1988 (the 1988 Act) in its continued efforts to 
stop child pornography.71 The law banned the use of computers to 
transport, distribute or receive child pornography.72 Congress 
passed the law in response to evidence that computer networks 
played a substantial role in the exchange of child pornography.73 
                                                          
67 Pub. L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. (1984). See also Jannelle E. Pretzer, United 
States v. United States District Court (Kantor): Protecting Children from Sexual 
Exploitation or Protecting the Pornography Producer?, 20 PAC. L.J. 1343, 
1356-57 (1989) (“Raising the age requirement from sixteen to eighteen makes it 
easier to prosecute the many cases in which fourteen or fifteen-year-olds have 
been sexually exploited, but proof of their age was not available.”). 
68 Annemarie J. Mazzone, United States v. Knox: Protecting Children from 
Sexual Exploitation through the Federal Child Pornography Laws, 5 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 167, 186 (1994) (explaining that the 1984 
revisions allowed federal officials to proceed against noncommercial producers 
and distributors). 
69 Id. at 186-87. 
70 Pub. L. No. 99-628, § 2, 100 Stat. 3510 (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 2251 (1986)). 
71 Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2251A-2252 (1998)). 
72 Id. 
73 See generally, Computer Pornography and Child Exploitation Act: 
Hearings on S. 1305 Before the Subcomm. on Juvenile Justice of the Senate 
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“The main innovation of the 1988 Act was its recordkeeping 
requirement,” used to facilitate the enforcement of criminal child 
pornography laws.74 Congress’ goal was to compel producers of 
sexually explicit images to educate themselves and others about 
the ages of the subjects of visual depictions.75 In furtherance of this 
goal, the 1988 Act required “all persons producing material 
containing visual depictions made after February 6, 1978, showing 
actual explicit sexual activity to determine the true age of the 
performers, to maintain records containing this information, and to 
affix to each copy of the material a statement about where these 
records could be found.”76 The records could not be used in 
criminal prosecutions.77 Failure to comply with these 
recordkeeping requirements, however, gave rise to a rebuttable 
presumption that the performers were under the age of eighteen.78 
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Osborne,79 holding that 
                                                          
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. (1985); Child Protection and Obscenity 
Enforcement Act and Pornography Victims Protection Act of 1987: Hearings on 
S. 704 and S. 2033 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 
(1988). 
74 American Library Ass’n v. Barr, 956 F.2d 1178, 1182 (1992). 
Associations representing producers and distributors of books, magazines and 
films brought action to challenge the constitutionality of the recordkeeping 
provision of the Child Protection and Obscenity Act of 1988. Id. The Court of 
Appeals held that claims attacking recordkeeping provisions were mooted by 
enactment of new legislation eliminating the recordkeeping provisions of the 
Act. Id. 
75 Id. 
76 18 U.S.C. § 2257 (1988). 
77 Id. 
78 See id. Portions of these recordkeeping provisions were later held 
unconstitutional because they burdened “too heavily” the right to produce 
material protected by the First Amendment and because they were not “narrowly 
tailored” to ban only child pornography. See American Library Ass’n v. 
Thornburgh, 713 F. Supp. 469 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The 1990 amendment 
incorporated recordkeeping requirements but “significantly altered” the “scope 
and burden” of the section’s original recordkeeping requirements. American 
Library Ass’n v. Reno, 33 F.3d 78 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
79 495 U.S. 103 (1990). See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text 
(discussing the Osborne decision and its impact on the state of the law 
respecting pornography). 
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the First Amendment does not protect child pornography, Congress 
enacted the Child Protection Restoration and Penalties 
Enhancement Act of 1990 (the 1990 Amendment).80 The 1990 
Amendment went further than the 1988 Act and banned the mere 
knowing possession of child pornography.81 This version of the 
federal child pornography law prohibited an individual from 
knowingly receiving or possessing three or more books or films 
that have been mailed between states and which contain visual 
depictions of a child under the age of eighteen engaging in 
sexually explicit conduct.82 In 1994, the 1977 federal law was 
again amended to prohibit the production or importation of 
sexually explicit depictions of minors.83 The amended law also 
provided for mandatory restitution for victims of child 
pornography.84 
C.  The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 
Notwithstanding its history of amendments and alterations, 
child pornography law had yet to face its greatest challenge—the 
enactment of prohibitions on the creation and possession of virtual 
child pornography.85 Before the CPPA was enacted in 1996, 
                                                          
80 Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 301, 104 Stat. 4789 (codified as amended at 18 




84 18 U.S.C. § 2259 (2003). Individuals harmed as a result of the 
commission of child pornography were entitled to the “full amount of the 
victim’s losses” including any costs incurred by the victim for: (a) medical 
services relating to physical, psychiatric, or psychological care; (b) physical or 
occupational therapy or rehabilitation; (c) necessary transportation; temporary 
housing; and child care expenses; (d) lost income; (e) attorney’s fees, as well as 
other costs incurred; and (f) any other losses suffered by the victim as a 
proximate result of the offense. Id. 
85 See Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(noting that, until the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Congress had 
yet to define the problem of child pornography in terms of animated visual 
depictions of children). “The actual participation and abuse of children in the 
production or dissemination of pornography involving minors was the sine qua 
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Congress’ focus on eliminating the problem of child pornography 
was limited exclusively to prohibiting the possession or 
dissemination of pornography involving real minors.86 The 
development of computer-related technology, however, led 
Congress to expand child pornography laws to address visual 
depictions that appear to be of real children.87 
The CPPA expanded the scope of existing federal law to 
include “virtual child pornography,” defined as: 
[A]ny visual depiction, including any photograph, film, 
video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or 
picture, whether made or produced by electronic, 
mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit conduct, 
where (a) the production of such visual depiction involves 
the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; 
(b) such visual depiction is, or appears to be, of a minor 
engaging in sexually explicit conduct; (c) such visual 
depiction has been created, adapted, or modified to appear 
that an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit 
conduct; or (d) such visual depiction is advertised, 
promoted, presented, described, or distributed in such a 
manner that conveys the impression that the material is or 
contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually 
explicit conduct.88 
Because the CPPA included language banning images that “appear 
to be of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct,”89 the new 
definition of child pornography included all apparent child 
pornography, regardless of whether any real children were 
involved in its creation.90 
The Government, arguing that the CPPA’s ban on virtual child 
pornography was constitutional, asserted that its inclusion of an 
                                                          
non of the regulating scheme.” Id. at 1087. 
86 See id. 
87 See id. (discussing the development of the new law to prevent the use of 
technology for “evil” purposes). 
88 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) (1996). 
89 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252, 2256 (1996). 
90 Id. 
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affirmative defense ensured the Act could stand up to a First 
Amendment challenge.91 The affirmative defense allowed a 
defendant to avoid conviction for nonpossession offenses by 
showing that the materials were “produced using only adults and 
were not otherwise distributed in a manner conveying the 
impression that they depicted real children.”92 The Ashcroft Court 
did not officially rule on the affirmative defense in the Act, but did 
point out that the affirmative defense in the Act was incomplete as 
well as insufficient.93 The Court reasoned, therefore, that the 
affirmative defense could not save the statute from a First 
Amendment challenge.94 The provision was incomplete because, 
while it allowed a defendant charged with possession to defend on 
the ground that the film depicts only adult actors, it did not allow a 
defendant charged with distribution of a proscribed work to raise 
the same affirmative defense.95 Furthermore, the Court found the 
affirmative defense was insufficient because it did not protect 
individuals who produced speech solely through the use of 
technology and did not use images of adult actors who appeared to 
be minors.96 Consequently, a defendant remained open to 
prosecution even where he could demonstrate that no children 
were harmed in the production of the pornographic images.97 
                                                          
91 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 237 (stating that the 
Government’s reliance on the CPPA’s affirmative defense is misplaced). The 
Court allows for the possibility that an affirmative defense might in some 
circumstances save a statute from a First Amendment challenge. Id. at 256. 
Here, the Court stated that the defense is insufficient as it does not apply to 
possession or to images created by computer images. Id. As a result, a large 
amount of speech unrelated to the Government’s interest in prosecuting 
offenders who use images of real children is left unprotected. Id. 18 U.S.C. § 
2252A(c) (1996). 
92 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c). 
93 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 237 (2002). 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 255-56. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. The affirmative defense supplies the defendant with an opportunity to 
prove that his speech is lawful only where he can establish that the actors used 
in the production of the work were adults. Id. The Court also noted that the 
CPPA’s affirmative defense was lacking because proving that speech is lawful is 
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II.  TURNING THE FIRST AMENDMENT “UPSIDE DOWN”: ASHCROFT 
V. FREE SPEECH COALITION 
When faced with the question whether virtual child 
pornography as defined in the CPPA falls outside the protection of 
the First Amendment, the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Free 
Speech Coalition answered with a resounding “No.”98 According 
to the Court, the CPPA is overbroad because it abridges an 
individual’s freedom to engage in a substantial amount of lawful 
speech and thus violates the First Amendment of the 
Constitution.99 “The statute proscribes the visual depiction of an 
idea—that of minors engaging in sexual activity—that is a fact of 
modern society and has been a theme in art and literature 
throughout the ages.”100 Thus, the statute prohibits speech despite 
its serious literary, political or scientific value.101 
                                                          
a heavy burden and an innocent possessor would most likely have difficulty 
proving the age of the actors. Id. Further, even if the defendant himself 
possessed the work, the producer himself may not have “preserved the records 
necessary to meet the burden of proof.” Id. at 256. See infra Part IV (asserting 
that the affirmative defense in the PROTECT Act similarly creates an 
unreasonable burden on the defendant). 
98 Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 234-58. The Free Speech Coalition, a trade 
association of businesses involved in the production and distribution of “adult 
oriented materials,” and other parties, sought declaratory and injunctive relief by 
a pre-enforcement challenge to certain provisions of the CPPA before the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of California. Id. at 234. The 
Government moved for summary judgment, which the court granted. Plaintiffs 
appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Free Speech Coalition 
v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999), which reversed the lower court decision. 
Id. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id. Justice Kennedy delivered the 
opinion of the Court. Id. 
99 Id. at 256-58. The First Amendment does not protect all categories of 
speech. Id. at 245-46. Defamation, incitement, obscenity, and pornography 
produced with real children may be prohibited without violating the First 
Amendment. Id. As the Ashcroft Court stated, though, none of these categories 
includes the speech prohibited by the CPPA. Id. at 246. 
100 Id. at 246. 
101 Id. The Court notes the literary merit of the themes of teenage sexual 
activity and the sexual abuse of children. Id. at 248. The Court points to the 
works of William Shakespeare as well as to modern Academy Award-nominated 
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The Government argued that the possibility of producing 
images through the use of computer imaging makes it very difficult 
to prosecute those who produce pornography using real children 
because experts may have difficulty determining whether the 
pictures were made by using real children or computer imaging.102 
The necessary solution, the Government continued, is to prohibit 
both kinds of images.103 The Government asserted a compelling 
interest in ensuring that criminal prohibitions against child 
pornography “remain enforceable and effective.”104 The Court 
interpreted the Government to be arguing that “protected speech 
may be banned as a means to ban unprotected speech.”105 The 
Court refused to follow this reasoning to uphold the CPPA’s 
constitutionality because this analysis, said Justice Kennedy, “turns 
the First Amendment upside down.”106 In fact, First Amendment 
jurisprudence requires the opposite.107 It is preferable to permit 
                                                          
films like Traffic and American Beauty, both of which depict underage 
characters engaging in sexual relations. Id. at 247-48 A single graphic depiction 
within such works of sexual activity that “appears to” involve a minor would 
subject the possessor to harsh punishment “without inquiry into the work’s 
redeeming value”. Id. at 248. The Court stated that: 
Our society, like other cultures, has empathy and enduring fascination 
with the lives and destinies of the young. Art and literature express the 
vital interest we all have in the formative years we ourselves once 
knew, when wounds can be so grievous, disappointment so profound, 
and mistaken choices so tragic, but when moral acts and self-fulfillment 
are still in reach. Whether or not the films we mention violate the 
CPPA, they explore themes within the wide sweep of the statute’s 
prohibitions. 
Id. 
102 Id. at 254-55. 
103 Id. 
104 See H.R. REP. NO. 107-526, at 2 (2002) (citing legislative findings for 
the proposed Child Obscenity and Pornography Prevention Act of 2002). 
105 Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 255. 
106 Id. “The Government may not suppress lawful speech as a means to 
suppress unlawful speech.” Id. The Court’s analysis rests on the presumption 
that virtual child pornography in which no children are directly involved, is 
speech entitled to First Amendment protection. Id. 
107 Id. 
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some unprotected speech to go unpunished than to suppress speech 
that should be protected.108 This principle, known as the 
overbreadth doctrine, prohibits statutory prohibitions of speech 
where “a substantial amount of protected speech is prohibited or 
chilled in the process.”109 
Moreover, the Ashcroft Court rejected the Government’s 
contention that speech prohibited by the CPPA is “virtually 
indistinguishable from material that may be banned under Ferber” 
and therefore virtual child pornography should similarly be 
proscribed under the First Amendment.110 The Ferber Court 
supported its decision to ban child pornography using real children 
based on its finding that the acts were “intrinsically related” to the 
sexual abuse of children.111 The Ashcroft Court’s ruling was 
consistent with the holding in Ferber in that virtual child 
pornography, unlike the real child pornography banned in Ferber, 
is not “intrinsically related” to the sexual abuse of children.112 The 
Court concluded that speech prohibited by the ban on virtual child 
pornography in the CPPA is distinguishable from speech 
                                                          
108 See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) (discussing 
application of the overbreadth doctrine). Broadrick involved a class action 
brought by certain Oklahoma state employees seeking a declaration that a state 
statute regulating political activity by state employees was invalid since it was 
impermissibly vague. Id. The Court held that the statute was not substantially 
overbroad and thus was not unconstitutional on its face. Id. at 618. 
109 See Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. 
REV. 844 (1970) (explaining the overbreadth doctrine). For example, 
overbreadth attacks have been sustained where the Court believed that rights of 
associations were ensnared in statutes which, by their broad sweep, might result 
in burdening innocent associations. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 
(1973) (citations omitted). 
110 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002). See supra Part 
I.A (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in New York v. Ferber). 
111 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982). First, child pornography 
creates a permanent record of a child’s abuse. Second, since traffic in child 
pornography is an economic motive for its production, “the State had an interest 
in closing the distribution network.” Id. 
112 Id. The Ferber decision, while holding that child pornography is not 
protected by the First Amendment, based its decision on the harm suffered by 
children during the production of child pornography, rather than on the idea that 
such depictions communicate. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758. 
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prohibited by the ban on child pornography under Ferber because 
the CPPA prohibits speech “that records no crime and creates no 
victims by its production.”113 Virtual child pornography is not 
“intrinsically related” to the sexual abuse of children, according to 
the Supreme Court, since any causal link between virtual images 
and harm to real children is “contingent and indirect.”114 
The Ferber Court not only distinguished between real and 
virtual child pornography, it relied on this distinction to support its 
holding.115 “Ferber did not hold that child pornography is by 
definition without value. The Court recognized that some works in 
this category might have significant value,116 but relied on virtual 
images—the very images prohibited by the CPPA—as an 
alternative and permissible means of expression.”117 Because the 
Ferber Court relied on the distinction between real and virtual 
child pornography to support its holding, the Ashcroft Court 
reasoned that the holding could not be used to support the CPPA, 
“a statute that eliminates this distinction.”118 
III.  TAILORING VIRTUAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LAWS TO MEET 
                                                          
113 Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 236. 
114 Id. “The harm does not necessarily follow from the speech, but depends 
upon some unquantified potential for subsequent criminal acts.” Id. The Court 
disagreed with the government’s argument that virtual child pornography would 
result in harm to real children in the form of sexual abuse. Id. This argument is 
based on the premise that virtual child pornography “whets the appetites of 
pedophiles and encourages them to engage in illicit conduct.” Id. at 253. The 
Court responded that it could not ban virtual child pornography offenses merely 
because virtual child pornography may have a tendency to encourage real child 
pornography offenses because this comes to close to banning thought rather than 
action. Id. See infra Part V (discussing realistic solutions to the problems 
associated with the advent and existence of virtual child pornography). 
115 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765. The Court stated that the “[d]istribution of 
descriptions or other depictions of sexual conduct, not otherwise obscene, which 
do not involve live performance or photographic or other visual reproduction of 
live performances by children retain First Amendment protection.” Id. at 764-
65. 
116 Id. at 761. 
117 Id. at 763. 
118 Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 251. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS 
According to the Government, the existence of computer-
generated child pornography has already affected its ability to 
prosecute child pornography offenders.119 In 1992, federal 
prosecutors brought suit against 104 child pornography 
offenders.120 Of these prosecutions, 85 defendants pled guilty and 
9 cases resulted in a guilty verdict.121 In contrast, data from 1999 
shows that of 510 prosecutions, 360 defendants pled guilty and 18 
cases resulted in a guilty verdict.122 These statistics show a drop in 
the number of guilty pleas as well as a decrease in the number of 
successful prosecutions.123 
Congressional findings reveal that the vast majority of child 
pornography prosecutions today involve images contained on the 
defendant’s computer hard drive, computer disk or related 
media.124 Congress found that child pornography offenses were 
pursued in only the most “clear-cut” cases in which there was 
substantial evidence to support the defendant’s guilt.125 To be sure, 
                                                          
119 See H.R. REP. No. 107-526, at 2 (2002) (citing legislative findings of the 
adverse impact of the Court’s holding in Ashcroft on the ability to prosecute 
offenders used in support of the Child Obscenity and Pornography Prevention 
Act of 2002). 
120 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REVIEW OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND 
OBSCENITY CRIMES, REPORT NO. I-2001-07 (Jul. 2001), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov [hereinafter DEP’T OF JUSTICE REPORT]. 
121 Id. Nine of these cases were dismissed. Id. 
122 Id. Thirty of these cases were dismissed. Id. 
123 See id. 
124 H.R. 4623, at § 2 (2002). 
125 Pub. L. 108-21, Title V, § 501, Apr. 30, 2003, 117 Stat. 676. Evidence 
submitted to the Congress, including evidence from the National Center for 
Missing and Exploited Children, demonstrates that “technology already exists to 
disguise depictions of real children to make them unidentifiable and to make 
depictions of real children appear computer generated.” Id. The technology will 
soon exist, if it does not already, to make depictions of virtual children look real. 
Congress found that: “The vast majority of child pornography prosecutions 
today involve images contained on computer hard drives, computer disks, and/or 
related media,” id.; “technological advances since Ferber have led many 
criminal defendants to suggest that the images of child pornography they 
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the primary reasons reported by prosecutors for deciding not to 
prosecute a case involving child pornography included weak 
evidence (22.9 percent), lack of evidence (11.7 percent) and lack 
of evidence that a federal crime has been committed (11.5 
percent).126 
Data provided by law enforcement agents shows that when a 
child pornographer is arrested, he usually has in his possession a 
collection of child pornography either in hard copies or loaded on 
computer disks.127 Problems prosecuting offenders often arise due 
to the difficulty or impossibility of identifying the children who 
participated in the production of the pornography where 
technology has been used to alter images.128 Further, computer 
technology may make it impossible to identify whether an image 
                                                          
possess are not those of real children, insisting that the government prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the images are not computer-generated,” id.; 
“[s]uch challenges will likely increase after the Ashcroft v. Free Speech 
Coalition decision,” id.; “[c]hild pornography circulating on the Internet has, by 
definition, been digitally uploaded or scanned into computers and has been 
transferred over the Internet, often in different file formats, from trafficker to 
trafficker,” id.; “[a]n image seized from a collector of child pornography is 
rarely a first-generation product, and the retransmission of images can alter the 
image so as to make it difficult for even an expert conclusively to opine that a 
particular image depicts a real child. If the original image has been scanned from 
a paper version into a digital format, this task can be even harder since proper 
forensic delineation may depend on the quality of the image scanned and the 
tools used to scan it,” id.; “[t]he impact on the government’s ability to prosecute 
child pornography offenders is already evident. The Ninth Circuit has seen a 
significant adverse effect on prosecutions since the 1999 Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals decision in Free Speech Coalition.” Id. 
126 DEP’T OF JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 120. 
127 See Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1995: Hearings on S.1237 
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 21 (1996). 
128 See Lydia W. Lee, Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996: 
Confronting the Challenges of Virtual Reality, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 639, 
676 (1999) (pointing out that enforcement of existing child pornography laws 
would be “nearly impossible” if virtual child pornography is left outside the 
scope of criminal liability because the average viewer would be unable to 
distinguish between real and virtual child pornography). The average viewer 
includes the child-victim, perpetrator, police, prosecutor, judge, and jury. Id. 
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of a real child was used in the creation of child pornography.129 
Developments in computer technology that make virtual and 
real child pornography virtually indistinguishable have led to the 
creation of a good faith or reasonable doubt defense in the 
enforcement of child pornography laws.130 As a result, criminal 
defendants who might easily have been prosecuted in the past 
evade conviction by creating a reasonable doubt as to their guilt 
where they claim that their conduct merely involved virtual child 
pornography and not a real child.131 For example, in United States 
v. Kimbrough, the defense introduced expert witness testimony that 
computers could be used to generate pictures of children that were 
undetectably identical to actual child pornography.132 This ability 
could have created a reasonable doubt in the jury’s mind about 
whether the pictures in the defendant’s possession were real.133 




132 69 F.3d 723 (5th Cir. 1995). Kimbrough was convicted of two counts of 
receipt of child pornography and two counts of possession of child pornography. 
Id. at 735. His conviction was reversed in part and remanded for the trial court 
to vacate Kimbrough’s conviction and to resentence him within the trial court’s 
discretion. Id. at 730. The court required that a jury find beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Kimbrough knew the images in his possession involved real children. 
Id. at 733. Kimbrough was ultimately convicted. Id. at 737. See John P. 
Feldmeier, Close Enough for Government Work: An Examination of 
Congressional Efforts to Reduce the Government’s Burden of Proof in Child 
Pornography Cases, 30 N. KY. L. REV. 205, 220 (2003) (arguing that the 
“virtual child” defense has not been a successful one for defendants, contrary to 
the government’s assertions). 
133 Id. See United States v. Sims, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1222 (D.N.M. 2002) 
(after the decision in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, court entertained 
motion to reconsider previously denied motion for judgment of acquittal; 
judgment of acquittal was granted with respect to one set of images in which the 
government had no evidence other than the images themselves); United States v. 
Bunnell, 2002 WL 927765 (D. Me. 2002) (after the Ashcroft case was decided, 
defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea granted); United States v. Reilly, 
2002 WL 31307170 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (after Ashcroft, defendant’s motion to 
withdraw guilty plea granted. The court held that the government must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew that the images depicted real 
children). 
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Congressional findings suggest that prosecutors, having 
difficulty prosecuting offenders, are bringing cases against 
individuals only where they can specifically identify the child 
depicted or where the image originated.134 The Government 
utilized these findings as support for proposed legislation, the 
Child Obscenity and Pornography Prevention Acts of 2002 and 
2003,135 as well as for the newly enacted the PROTECT Act.136 
The COPPA of 2002 of 2003137 were the subject of criticism 
                                                          
134 See H.R. REP. No. 107-526, at 2 (2002). The National Center for 
Missing and Exploited Children testified at Congressional hearings that 
prosecutors around the country have expressed concern about whether 
previously indicted cases will continue to be viable. Id. They also expressed 
concern about whether potentially meritorious prosecutions will decline as a 
result of the Supreme Court’s affirmation of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Free 
Speech Coalition. See id.  Other Congressional findings include the following: 
(1) Obscenity and child pornography are not entitled to protection 
under the First Amendment and thus may be prohibited; (2) The 
Government has a compelling state interest in protecting children and 
those who sexually exploit them, including both child molesters and 
child pornographers; (3) The Government has a compelling interest in 
ensuring that the criminal prohibitions against child pornography 
remain enforceable and effective; (4) In 1982, when the Supreme Court 
decided Ferber, the technology did not exist to (a) create depictions of 
virtual children that are indistinguishable from depictions of real 
children, (b) create depictions of virtual children using compositions of 
real children to create an unidentifiable child, or (c) disguise pictures of 
real children being abused by making the image look computer 
generated. 
Id. 
135 H.R. 4623, 107th Cong. (2d Sess. 2002); H.R. 1161, 108th Cong. 
(2003). The proposed bills stated that child pornography exists by means of: 
[a]ny visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, 
or computer or computer-generated image or picture, whether made or 
produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means, of sexually 
explicit conduct, where: Such visual depiction is a computer image or 
computer-generated image that is, or is indistinguishable from, that of a 
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. 
H.R. REP. No. 107-526, at 2. 
136 See S.151, 108th Cong. (1st Sess. 2003). 
137 The COPPA of 2002 was passed by the House of Representatives by a 
413-8 vote. See David L. Hudson, A First Amendment Focus: Reflecting on the 
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because, like the CPPA, they criminalized virtual child 
pornography offenses.138 Neither proposed Act was enacted into 
                                                          
Virtual Child Porn Decision, J. MARSHALL L. REV. 211, 217 (2002). 
Subsequently, the President called upon the Senate to pass the legislation. See 
Joseph J. Beard, Virtual Kiddie Porn: A Real Crime? An Analysis of the 
PROTECT Act, 21 ENT. & SPORTS LAW 3 (analyzing the PROTECT Act, 
Congress’ latest legislative response to the problem of child pornography).  
However, differences between the COPPA of 2002 and the Senate version of 
this bill passed in November of 2003 could not be reconciled before the 
conclusion of the 107th Congress and the COPPA was never enacted into law. Id 
Undeterred by the failure of the 2002 Act, the House passed the COPPA of 2003 
on March 27, 2003. H.R. 1161, 108th Cong. (2003). Testimony in support of the 
bill states that the COPPA of 2003 is “closely modeled” on the COPPA of 2002. 
The Child Abduction Prevention Act and the Child Obscenity and Pornography 
Prevention Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 1104 and H.R. 1161 Before the 
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the House Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Daniel P. Collins, Associate 
Deputy Attorney General), available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/collins 
031103.htm. As such, the Act retained its proscription against virtual child 
pornography in its continued effort to protect the interests of child pornography 
victims. See H.R. 1161, 108th Cong. (2003). The COPPA of 2003 contains a 
revised version of § 2256(8)(B) of the CPPA. Id. The House replaced the 
“appears to be” language with the words “is, or is indistinguishable from.” Id. 
Second, the COPPA of 2003 removes § 2256(8)(D) of the CPPA, the 
subparagraph which contained the term “conveys the impression.” Id. By 
striking this provision, Congress removes the prohibition on material that “is 
advertised, promoted, presented, described, or distributed in such a manner that 
conveys the impression that the material is or contains a visual depiction of a 
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.” See id. Instead, the proposed Act 
provided that producers and distributors may not knowingly suggest that 
material portrays a minor engaging in sexually explicit material. Id. In effect, 
this incorporates a mens rea requirement into the statute in an attempt to remedy 
the Ashcroft Court’s concern regarding the overbreadth of this section of the 
CPPA. See id. In addition, the COPPA of 2003 included an affirmative defense 
which modifies the affirmative defense in the CPPA. Id. Under the affirmative 
defense provision, a defendant would be absolved of liability if he could show 
that the image for which he was arrested did not implicate a real child. Id. They 
could do this by establishing that either an adult or computer-generated image 
was used in the production of the alleged child pornography. Id. 
138 See Sara C. Marcy, Banning Virtual Child Pornography: Is There Any 
Way Around Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition?, 81 N. CAR. L. REV. 2136 
(2003) (citing criticisms of the COPPA of 2002 and 2003). 
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law; However, Congress ultimately incorporated provisions from 
the COPPA of 2002 and 2003 into the PROTECT Act.139 As such, 
the controversy surrounding virtual child pornography continues 
with respect to the current law.140 
According to its supporters, the PROTECT Act addresses the 
difficulty prosecutors have had in the wake of the Ashcroft 
decision by attempting to “[s]trengthen the laws against child 
pornography in ways that can survive constitutional review.”141 
The PROTECT Act seeks to address the Ashcroft Court’s concerns 
about the unconstitutionality of the CPPA.142 The PROTECT Act, 
like the COPPA, amends the CPPA in an attempt to meet the 
standards of the First Amendment.143 
Specifically, the law amends section 2256(8)(B) of the 
CPPA,144 replacing the constitutionally deficient “appears to be” 
language with the words “indistinguishable from.”145 Specifically, 
the Act bans “Obscene Child Pornography,” defined as “a visual 
depiction of any kind, including a drawing, cartoon, sculpture, or 
painting” that depicts an actual minor or image that “appears to be 
of a minor” engaging in “graphic” sexual activity and “lacks 
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”146 This 
                                                          
139 Doug Isenberg, The Wrong Answer to Child Porn on the Net, CNET 
News.com, May 15, 2003, available at http://news.com.com/2010-1071_3-
1001105.html (stating that the Act “has received widespread publicity for its 
coordination of nationwide efforts to locate missing children and their 
abductors, an effort that has gained momentum thanks in part to the work of Ed 
Smart, father of formerly missing Salt Lake City teenager Elizabeth Smart”). 
140 Marcy, supra note 138, at 2153. 
141 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: PROTECT ACT, available at 
http:///www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/April/ 03_ag_266.htm. 
142 See id. 
143 See Marcy, supra note 138, at 2152 (discussing provisions of the 
PROTECT Act in light of the Supreme Court’s concerns in Ashcroft). 
144 18 U.S.C. § 2256 (West 2000). 
145 Pub. L 108-21, April 30, 2003, 117 Stat 650; 18 U.S.C. 2256(8). The 
PROTECT Act expands the definition of “child pornography” to include a 
digital images, computer images or computer-generated images that are 
indistinguishable from minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct. Id. 
Indistinguishable is defined as “virtually indistinguishable.” Id. 
146 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(a)(2)-(b)(2). The Act defines “graphic” images as 
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definition necessarily includes images which are not created with 
the use of real children.147 
In addition, the PROTECT Act, like the COPPA, incorporates 
a knowledge requirement.148 Thus, a person is in violation of the 
Act if he or she knowingly 
[R]eproduces any child pornography for distribution 
through the mails, or in interstate or foreign commerce by 
any means, including computer or advertises, promotes, 
presents, distributes, or solicits through the mails, or in 
interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by 
computer, any material or purported material in a manner 
that reflects the belief, or that is intended to cause another 
to believe, that the material or purported material is, or 
contains (i) an obscene visual depiction of a minor 
engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or (ii) a visual 
depiction of an actual minor engaging in sexually explicit 
conduct.149 
Significantly, the PROTECT Act, like the COPPA, places the 
burden of proof on the defendant to prove that the images did not 
depict real children, rather than requiring prosecutors to prove that 
the images were made from images of real children.150 In 
                                                          
those that are or appear to be of a minor “engaging in graphic bestiality, sadistic 
or masochistic abuse, or sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-
genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or 
opposite sex.” Id. 
147 See id. 
148 § 504(a), 117 Stat. at 680-81; Marcy, supra note 138, at 2153. 
149 § 504(a), 117 Stat. at 680-81. 
150 Id. A defendant might meet the affirmative defense by establishing the 
identity or existence of the actors used to create the pornography. See Hearing 
before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the 
Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives on H.R. 1104 and H.R. 
1161, Mar. 11, 2003 , available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/ 
judiciary/hju85642.000/hju85642_0f.htm (citing Honorable Robert C. Scott’s 
position with respect to the affirmative defense in the COPPA of 2003 that the 
“Government raises serious constitutional difficulties by seeking to impose on 
the defendant the burden of proving his speech is not lawful”). The Honorable 
Robert Scott points out that: 
Where the defendant is not the producer of the work, he may have no 
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promulgating this affirmative defense, Congress contends that the 
Supreme Court in Ashcroft left open the possibility that, had the 
existing affirmative defense been more complete, the 1996 statute 
might have survived a constitutional challenge, even if it was 
overbroad.151 The affirmative defense allows a defendant to show 
that “the alleged child pornography was produced using an actual 
person or persons engaging in sexually explicit conduct and each 
such person was an adult at the time the material was produced,” 
or that “the alleged child pornography was not produced using any 
actual minor or minors.”152 
IV.  FACING THE FIRST AMENDMENT: WHY LAWS PROSCRIBING 
VIRTUAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY SUSPECT 
The prohibitions on virtual child pornography contained in the 
                                                          
way of establishing the identity or even the existence of the actors, and 
if the evidentiary issue is a serious problem for the Government, as it 
asserts, it will be at least as difficult for the innocent possessor. 
Id. Under the PROTECT Act, it is an affirmative defense that: 
The alleged child pornography was produced using an actual person or 
persons engaged in sexually explicit conduct; and each person was an 
adult at the time the material was produced; or the alleged child 
pornography was not produced using any actual minor or minors. 
18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c)(2) (2002). 
151 See id; see also Jason Baruch, Case Comment, Constitutional Law: 
Permitting Virtual Child Pornography—A First Amendment Requirement, Bad 
Policy, or Both?, 55 FLA. L. REV. 1073 (2003). Baruch explains that: 
Even if the Government were to prosecute parties uttering protected 
speech, courts generally do, on a “case-by-case analysis,” correct the 
misapplication of an overbroad statute. A fortiori, the CPPA provides 
defendants with an affirmative defense that facilitates such correction. 
Id. at 1087. 
152 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c)(1)(A), (B); 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c)(2). See also 
John P. Feldmeier, Close Enough for Government Work: An Examination of 
Congressional Efforts to Reduce the Government’s Burden of Proof in Child 
Pornography Cases, 30 N. KY. L. REV. 205 (2003). The PROTECT Act also 
incorporates the COPPA of 2003’s requirement that the defendant give notice to 
the prosecution that it will raise the affirmative defense so as to prevent “unfair 
surprise” at trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A. 
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PROTECT Act are constitutionally deficient and should be struck 
down under the First Amendment.153 Actual child pornography is, 
without question, not constitutionally protected speech.154 On the 
other hand, sexually explicit material that does not involve actual 
children does not fall within the definition of “child 
pornography.”155 The Ashcroft Court struck down the CPPA on the 
fact that it was overbroad because it criminalized speech that was 
not obscene and did not involve real children.156 The PROTECT 
Act suffers from the same fatal flaw as the CPPA: The bill is 
similarly overbroad in that it bans innocent speech and works of 
literary, artistic or political merit in an effort to proscribe virtual 
child pornography.157 
To be sure, while the Act amends the CPPA, replacing the 
constitutionally-deficient “appears to be” language, the language 
inserted in its place is similarly inconsistent with the First 
Amendment.158 The PROTECT Act makes illegal the possession 
or distribution of computer images or computer-generated images 
that are, or are indistinguishable from, that of a minor engaging in 
sexually explicit conduct.159 The words “indistinguishable from” 
create the same problem from a constitutional standpoint as the 
words “appears to be” because they prohibit what the Supreme 
Court held could not be prohibited—the creation of virtual images 
that do not implicate or harm children.160 
As a result of the overbreadth of the statutory language, artists 
and filmmakers would remain vulnerable to prosecution where 
they create artistic works without the use of actual children.161 The 
Court in Ashcroft unambiguously held that a defendant could not 
                                                          
153 Pub. L. No. 108-21. 
154 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758 (1982). 
155 See id. 
156 See supra Part I (discussing the Ashcroft Court’s holding that 
pornography which does not involve real children could not be proscribed by the 
CPPA). 
157 See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 246 (2002). 
158 18 U.S.C. § 2252(A); Feldmeier, supra note 152, at 218. 
159 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) (1996). 
160 See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 246. 
161 Id. at 246-47. 
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be convicted for creating images that do not involve real 
children.162 The virtual child pornography provisions of the 
PROTECT Act will fail on the same ground as the CPPA failed in 
Ashcroft—the Act punishes a defendant where no real children are 
implicated or harmed.163 
In support of legislation banning virtual child pornography, 
Congress seems to assert that the Ashcroft Court did not consider 
the harm that would occur to real children when technology makes 
it impossible to distinguish real children from virtual children.164 
An examination of the Ashcroft opinion, however, reveals that the 
Court did consider this issue and found that the argument 
nevertheless did not provide support for the prohibition against 
virtual child pornography.165 In response to the Government’s 
assertion that virtual images promote trafficking in works produced 
through the exploitation of real children, the Court stated that 
“[t]he hypothesis is somewhat implausible. If virtual images were 
identical to illegal child pornography, the illegal images would be 
driven from the market by the indistinguishable substitutes. Few 
pornographers would risk prosecution by abusing real children if 
fictional, computerized images would suffice.”166 
Furthermore, it is unlikely the affirmative defense included in 
the PROTECT Act will save the PROTECT Act from a 
constitutional challenge because it imposes too heavy a burden on 
defendants.167 The government’s arguments in support of the 
                                                          
162 See id. The Court in Ashcroft stated, “the CPPA prohibits speech that 
records no crime and creates no victims by its production. Virtual child 
pornography is not ‘intrinsically related’ to the sexual abuse of children . . . .” 
Id. 
163 See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing the unconstitutional 
provision of the COPPA which proscribed virtual child pornography). 
164 See H.R. REP. No. 107-526, at 7-13 (2002) (asserting the need for 
legislation proscribing virtual child pornography). “Child pornography—virtual 
or otherwise—is detrimental to the nation’s most precious and vulnerable 
asset—our children. Regardless of the method of its production, child 
pornography is used to promote and incite deviant and dangerous behavior in 
our society.” Id. at 12. 
165 Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 253. 
166 Id. at 254. 
167 Feldmeier, supra note 152, at 223. 
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affirmative defense assert that requiring the state to identify 
whether an image is graphic or a real photograph places an 
unrealistic burden on prosecutors.168 But if this argument stands, 
and if requiring the government to identify the children in alleged 
pornographic materials is an impossible burden to meet, the logical 
conclusion is that requiring a defendant to establish the identity of 
the children in such images is similarly unreasonable.169 The Court 
in Ashcroft, while leaving the door open to the possibility that an 
affirmative defense could save the CPPA, was very clear that the 
evidentiary burden at hand was not a “trivial” one.170 According to 
the Court, “if the evidentiary issue is a serious problem for the 
Government, as it asserts, it will be at least as difficult for the 
innocent possessor.”171 The Court further stated that 
[t]he Government raises serious constitutional difficulties 
by seeking to impose on the defendant the burden of 
proving his speech is not unlawful. An affirmative defense 
applies only after prosecution has begun, and the speaker 
                                                          
168 See id. at 242. Even some supporters of the COPPA of 2003 concede 
that Prosecutors’ hands are not entirely tied by the Ashcroft decision. According 
to Associate Deputy General Daniel Collins: 
Prosecutors have several potential avenues for proving that a child 
depicted in an image is real. First, prosecutors might know the identity 
of a particular child depicted in an image from another child sex abuse 
situation. Second, prosecutors might be able to establish that a given 
image predates the technology at issue. Third, prosecutors might be 
able to present expert testimony that a given image likely depicts a real 
child. 
The Child Abduction Prevention Act and the Child Obscenity and Pornography 
Prevention Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 1104 and H.R. 1161 Before the 
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the House Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Daniel P. Collins, Associate 
Deputy Attorney General), available at http://www.house.gov/ 
judiciary/collins031103.htm. 
169 See Feldmeier, supra note 152, at 225. “If the government, with its 
seemingly infinite resources, is purportedly having trouble proving that a 
depiction is that of a real minor, then how can criminal defendants, many of 
whom are indigent, be expected to do so?” Id. 
170 Ascroft, 535 U.S. at 255. 
171 Id. at 255-56. 
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must himself prove, on pain of a felony conviction, that his 
conduct falls within the affirmative defense.172 
This burden shifting creates constitutional due process 
concerns.173 Due process requires that the prosecution prove each 
and every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.174 
Shifting the burden to the defendant to show that images that are 
indistinguishable from or appear to be actual minors do not involve 
real children creates a constitutionally impermissible presumption 
that the defendant was in possession of real child pornography 
images in the first place.175 The affirmative defense would allow a 
defendant to rebut this presumption.176 It is the presumption itself, 
however, that is problematic from a constitutional standpoint 
because it “relieves the government of its burden of proof on an 
essential element of the case”—namely that the images themselves 
depict real child pornography.177 
If the PROTECT Act comes before the Supreme Court on a 
constitutional challenge, the Court, following the Ashcroft holding, 
will likely conclude that the amended Act is similarly flawed with 
respect to the affirmative defense.178 Congress’ attempt to remedy 
the affirmative defense by stipulating that it applies to possession 
as well as to production and distribution of child pornography fails 
to protect individuals who create images in which no children were 
harmed.179 
V.  WHERE CONGRESS GETS IT RIGHT: VIABLE SOLUTIONS TO THE 
PROBLEM OF VIRTUAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 
Child pornography “abuses, degrades and exploits the weakest 
                                                          
172 Id. at 255. 






179 See Marcy, supra note 138, at 2146. 
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and most vulnerable members of our society.”180 The harms 
associated with the creation and distribution of child pornography 
are tremendous, both in nature and in scope.181 The children used 
to create child pornography suffer direct emotional and 
psychological problems.182 Furthermore, child pornography creates 
a record that could potentially exist forever, thereby deepening the 
harm associated with the crime.183 Moreover, sexual abusers may 
use already-created visual depictions to ensure that their victims 
will remain quiet about the exploitation.184 Offenders further 
perpetuate the cycle of child pornography by luring other children 
into modeling for them by using the images of other children to 
work a “peer pressure” approach on their prospective victims.185 
In enacting the CPPA of 1996, Congress recognized that 
pedophiles and sexual abusers use child pornography as a way “to 
stimulate and whet their own sexual appetites.”186 Thus, the 
significance of the effort to ban child pornography is heightened 
                                                          
180 S. REP. NO. 104-358, at 12 (1996). 
181 See id. (discussing the role of child pornography in the cycle of child 
abuse and exploitation); Sarah Sternberg, The Child Pornography Prevention 
Act of 1996 and the First Amendment: Virtual Antithesis, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2783, 2785 (2001) (noting that the “harms associated with child pornography are 
as varied as they are egregious”). 
182 See Sternberg, supra note 181, at 2785. 
183 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 n.10 (1982). Because child 
pornography creates an enduring record, it poses “an even greater threat to the 
child victim.” Id. “A child who has posed for a camera must go through life 
knowing that the recording is circulating within the mass distribution system for 
child pornography.” Id. In addition, “[t]he victim’s knowledge of publication of 
the visual material increases the emotional and psychic harm suffered by the 
child.” Id. 
184 Sternberg, supra note 181, at 2786. 
185 Id. The “peer pressure” consists of seven stages: (1) showing child 
pornography to a child for “educational purposes”; (2) attempting to persuade 
the child that sexual activity is permitted and even pleasurable; (3) convincing 
the child that because his peers engage in sexual activity, such activity is 
acceptable; (4) desensitizing the child and lowering the child’s inhibitions; (5) 
engaging the child in sexual activity; (6) photographing such sexual activity; and 
(7) using the resulting child pornography to “attract and seduce yet more child 
victims.” Id. 
186 S. REP. No. 104-358, at 13 (1996). 
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due to the stimulating effect such materials have on those who 
view it.187 Criminal investigations have shown that almost all 
pedophiles collect child pornography, which may escalate their 
addiction and desensitize them to its deviant nature.188 
According to the National Center for Missing and Exploited 
Children, child pornography prosecutions have increased an 
average of 10 percent per year every year since 1995.189 The 
government’s concern that the legality of virtual child pornography 
will stifle prosecutors in their effort to prosecute offenders of real 
child pornography laws is not without merit.190 First, there is 
Congress’ finding that, after the Ninth Circuit decision in Free 
Speech Coalition, prosecutions are increasingly being brought only 
in the most clear-cut cases.191 The Ninth Circuit’s decision also 
resulted in the release from prison of a man who pled guilty to 
possessing 2,600 images of child pornography.192 He was freed 
after a judge ruled that the state’s law was unconstitutional because 
it failed to distinguish between real and virtual pornography.193 
As the history of efforts to ban real child pornography 
                                                          
187 See id. 
188 Sternberg, supra note 181, at 2786. 
189 THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR MISSING AND EXPLOITED CHILDREN, 
available at http://www.missingkids. com (2004). 
190 See H.R. REP. No. 107-526, at 7 (2002). 
191 Id. 
192 See People v. Alexander, 791 N.E.2d 506 (S.Ct. Ill. 2003). Kenneth 
Alexander was charged under Illinois state law with 45 counts of child 
pornography. Id. He successfully challenged the law, whose definition of child 
pornography included virtual images, arguing that it was overbroad and thus 
violated the First Amendment. Id. at 511-12. See also Jan LaRue, Supreme 
Court Rules First Amendment Protects “Virtual” Child Porn, (Aug. 23, 2002), 
available at http://www.cwfa.org/articledisplay.asp?id=2044&department= 
CWA&categoryid=pornography. Kenneth Alexander was awaiting sentencing 
and faced up to 15 years in prison because police found close to 2,600 images of 
children engaging in lewd behavior with other children, adults and animals in 
his computer at his residence. Id. His attorney, Donald Morrison of Waukegan, 
however, challenged the state law to which Alexander pled guilty to on March 
28, citing the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition. 
Id. 
193 Id. 
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demonstrates, prohibitions on virtual child pornography will 
require continued amendments to bring the laws in harmony with 
the First Amendment.194 Unfortunately, resources and time spent 
by the government on passing constitutionally-suspect legislation 
diverts resources that can otherwise produce visible results in the 
fight against child pornography. Legislative attempts at proscribing 
virtual child pornography, instead of combating child pornography, 
will harm efforts to prosecute individuals who exploit real children 
by directing federal resources towards the constitutionally difficult 
task of prosecuting individuals who create or possess computer 
generated images.195 Rather than attempting to ban virtual child 
pornography, the government should strengthen other areas that 
would allow for more effective prosecution of offenders. 
First, federal funds should be allocated to programs such as the 
FBI Innocent Images Initiative, which identifies and investigates 
                                                          
194 See supra Part I.B (detailing changes in the law respecting 
pornography). The history of efforts to ban real child pornography is exhibited 
in the numerous amendments to the Protection of Children Against Sexual 
Exploitation Act of 1977. Pub. L. No. 95-225, 92 Stat. 7 (1978). 
195 A dialogue with ACLU member Nadine Strossen about the COPPA of 
2002 illustrates this dilemma: 
QUESTION: Earlier this year, the United States Supreme Court struck 
down the Child Pornography Prevention Act, which regulated so-called 
virtual child pornography, as fatally overboard. Congress responded by 
immediately going back to the drawing board to craft a supposedly 
more precise version of the CPPA called the Child Obscenity and 
Pornography Prevention Act of 2002. Is Congress wasting its time here, 
and, by extension, wasting taxpayers’ dollars, in attempting to regulate 
fake child pornography? 
RESPONSE: I admit I don’t know what the provisions of this new law 
are. If they are still dealing with what Justice Kennedy’s opinion 
correctly analogized to a thought crime, then we’re exactly in that area 
that I just talked about where protection is absolute. I would defend 
somebody’s right to look at any image that does not involve the use of 
an actual child no matter how realistic it is. If that’s what the new law 
is criminalizing, I think the Supreme Court’s rationale is going to 
extend to that legislation. 
Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, Nadine Strossen and Freedom of 
Expression: A Dialogue with the ACLU’s Top Card-Carrying Member, 13 GEO. 
MAS. UNIV. CIV. RTS. L. J., 185, 222-23 (2003). 
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individuals who use the Internet to exploit children.196 The 
Initiative reports that, throughout the FBI, there was a 1,280% 
increase in the number of child pornography cases opened between 
fiscal years 1996 and 2001.197 The organization anticipates that the 
number of cases opened and the amount of resources utilized to 
address the crime problem will continue to rise during the next 
several years.198 Recently, in March of 2002, the Initiative 
undertook “Operation Candyman,” in which it invested a great deal 
of time and energy to investigate an “Electronic Group” 
(“Egroup”), a “community” of people communicating via the 
Internet.199 An undercover agent uncovered three Yahoo! Egroups 
involved in posting, exchanging and transmitting child 
pornography.200 One website depicted the Egroup as a group “for 
people who love kids.”201 Subpoenas were issued on Internet 
providers for the addresses of individuals who frequented these 
sites.202 Information on approximately 1,400 subjects was 
provided, and at least eighty individuals have been charged.203 
                                                          
196 FBI INNOCENT IMAGES INITIATIVE, available at http://www.fbi.gov/hq 
/cid/cac/innocent.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2003). The Innocent Images initiative 
is composed of 23 task forces in 56 FBI field offices around the country, their 
purpose is to “investigate and eradicate online sexual exploitation of children 
and the production and distribution of child pornography.” Id. available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel102/cm 031802.htm. 
197 FBI INNOCENT IMAGES INITIATIVE available at http://www.fbi.gov/ 
pressrel/pressrel102/cm031802. htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2003). The number of 




200 Id. As of March 18, 2002, over 266 searches had been conducted. 
Twenty seven people had been arrested and admitted to the prior molestation of 
over 36 children. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION PRESS RELEASE, 
available at http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel/candyman/candymanhome. 
htm. 
201 The group also stated, “You can post any type of messages you like too 
or any type of pics and vids you like too. P.S. IF WE ALL WORK TOGETHER 
WE WILL HAVE THE BEST GROUP ON THE NET.” Id. 
202 Id. 
203 Id. 
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Moreover, the Justice Department should increase funding for 
the Internet Crimes Against Children Task Forces, a department 
that assists state and local authorities in combating child sexual 
exploitation. 204 Since 1998, the Task Forces have helped train 
more than 1,500 prosecutors and 1,900 investigators, and have 
provided direct investigative assistance in more than 3,000 cases 
involving individuals who allegedly use the Internet to perpetuate 
child pornography crimes.205 President George W. Bush has 
already pledged to increase efforts to expand the investigation and 
“vigorous prosecution of child exploitation on the Internet.”206 The 
executive branch seeks to increase funding in furtherance of such 
efforts.207 Congress should support such efforts, both financially 
and vocally, in order to strengthen efforts to prosecute child 
pornography offenders. 
In addition, as designated in the Child Pornography Prevention 
Act of 2002, resources should be allocated to: (1) create an FBI 
database of images already known to be of real children, thereby 
facilitating the prosecution of others found to have those images; 
(2) encourage greater voluntary reporting of suspected child 
pornography found by Internet companies; and (3) strengthen 
enhanced penalties for repeat offenders. 208 
The creation of an FBI database would answer Congress’ 
concerns with respect to the increased difficulties faced by the 
government in prosecuting child pornography offenders.209 
Evidence submitted to Congress, including testimony from the 
National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, demonstrates 
that technology already exists to disguise depictions of real 
children to make them unidentifiable and to make depictions of 
                                                          
204 THE WHITE HOUSE, Increasing Online Safety for America’s Children, 
Press Release (Oct. 23, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/ 
releases/2002/10/20021023.html. 
205 See id. 
206 Id. 
207 Id. 
208 See H.R. REP. No. 107-526 (2002). In addition to banning virtual child 
pornography, the COPPA of 2003 would also provide for an FBI database and 
encourage greater voluntary reporting by Internet companies. Id. 
209 Id. at 7-13. 
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real children appear computer-generated.210 The inability of 
prosecutors to identify the children who participate in the 
production of pornography allows criminal defendants who would 
have been easily prosecuted in the past to go free based on their 
claims that no real children were used in the production of the 
pornography.211 
The COPPA of 2002 included a provision for the creation of a 
database where images known to be of real children would be 
compiled.212 Such a database would ease prosecutions of child 
pornography offenders by refuting the “reasonable doubt” 
argument, i.e. that the images they possessed, distributed or created 
did not utilize real children.213 Images found in the possession of 
offenders could be matched up with those in the database to 
determine if any of the children’s photos match those of the 
“virtual” children.214 Efforts to create such a database are being 
hindered. Consequently, in a futile effort to ban virtual child 
pornography, Congress has impeded a portion of the Act that is 
likely to be of great practical use in prosecuting offenders. Rather 
than continuing to incorporate viable solutions within otherwise 
constitutionally faulty legislation, Congress should pass separate 
legislation that creates an FBI database and includes provisions 
designed to encourage greater reporting of suspected child 
pornography. 
Congress has also begun to address concerns about the lack of 
reporting of child pornography offenses.215 Part of the problem is 
the fact that children who are sexually victimized—in part due to 
intimidation by the individuals who exploit them—are not likely to 
report the exploitation.216 The CPPA of 1996 required 
                                                          
210 See id. 
211 See supra Part II (discussing the Ashcroft decision as well as the 
government’s concerns that the decision will make it difficult, if not impossible, 
to prosecute child pornography offenders in the wake of virtual child 
pornography technology). 
212 See H.R. 4623, 107th Cong. (2d Sess. 2002). 
213 See id. 
214 See id. 
215 See H.R. REP. No. 107-526 (2002). 
216 See THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR MISSING AND EXPLOITED CHILDREN, 
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communications providers to report to the National Center for 
Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) knowledge of facts or 
circumstances of potential sexual exploitation crimes against 
children.217 A provider of electronic communication services could 
be fined for knowingly and willfully failing to make a report.218 
The NCMEC was to forward the reports to law enforcement 
agencies designated by the Attorney General.219 
Congress stated in its legislative findings that the COPPA of 
2002 strengthens this reporting system by adding the new offenses 
under sections 1466A and 1466B—the sections of the Act 
proscribing virtual child pornography.220 Since the Act never went 
into effect, though, neither did the purported “stronger reporting 
system.” A more effective avenue to strengthen the reporting 
system in the 1996 Act would be to work closely with the NCMEC 
to encourage greater voluntary reporting of child pornography 
offenses by informing electronic communication service providers 
of their legal duty to report such offenses.221 To ensure and 
maximize the effectiveness and impact of such legislation, this 
legal duty should be addressed in a bill separate from any 
                                                          
available at http://www.missingkids.com. “A major step to eliminating child 
pornography is to make people knowledgeable of both federal and state laws 
regarding the definitions and criminal implications of child pornography. In 
doing so, the general public can become more responsive to the issue and report 
violations to the appropriate officials.” Id. 
217 H.R. REP. 107-526. The 1996 Act incorporated this as a legal duty. 18 
U.S.C. § 2251 (1996). 
218 18 U.S.C. § 2251. 
219 Id. 
220 Id. 
221 42 U.S.C. § 13032(b) (2003); 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(6) (2003). Pursuant 
to the Protection of Children from Sexual Predators Act of 1998, anyone 
engaged in providing an electronic communication service or a remote 
computing service to the public must report “knowledge of facts or 
circumstances” from which a violation of child pornography laws is apparent to 
the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) and the FBI 
or U.S. Customs Service. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(6). Such a report must be made 
“as soon as reasonably possible” after obtaining knowledge and should include 
“whatever information . . . that led it to conclude that a violation of federal child 
pornography statutes” had occurred. 42 U.S.C. § 13032(b). 
FARHANGIAN.DOC 3/3/2004  1:45 PM 
284 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
legislation that seeks to criminalize virtual child pornography 
offenses. Therefore, if a bill prohibiting virtual child pornography 
is defeated as unconstitutional or held up in a battle over its 
constitutionality, legislation will still exist to criminalize the failure 
of electronic communication service providers to report child 
pornography offenses. 
A possible method for progress in this area would be to make 
service providers aware of the ease by which they may report 
offenses to the NCMEC’s CyberTipline, launched on March 9, 
1998.222 The tip line serves as a national online clearinghouse for 
investigative leads and tips regarding child sexual exploitation.223 
The NCMEC has received and processed over 120,000 leads 
through the Cyber Tipline, at least half of which were reports of 
child pornography, resulting in hundreds of arrests and successful 
prosecutions.224 In light of the Cyber Tipline’s success, Congress 
should attempt to direct resources to assisting the NCMEC. 
Furthermore, in light of the limited federal resources available to 
investigate child pornography, Congress should expand the scope 
of investigators to include state and local law enforcement, 
provided that a proper system is implemented to facilitate the 
exchange of information between law enforcement on both state 
and federal levels.225 
                                                          
222 THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR MISSING AND EXPLOITED CHILDREN, Cyber 
Tipline Information and Success Stories, at http://www.missingkids.com 
/missingkids/ (2004). 
223 Id. The NCMEC’s CyberTipline is linked via server to the FBI, 
Customs Service and Postal Inspection Service. Id. Leads are received and 
reviewed by NCMEC’s analysts, who visit the reported sites, examine and 
evaluate the content, use search tools to try to identify perpetrators, and provide 
all lead information to the appropriate law enforcement agency and investigator. 
Id. Both the FBI and Customs Service have assigned agents who work directly 
out of the NCMEC, and review reports. Id. 
224 CYBER TIPLINE, Campaign Overview, at http://www.cybertipline.com/ 
missingkids/servlet/PageServlet?LanguageCountry= en_US&PageId=1230. 
225 See COMBATING CHILD PORNOGRAPHY: UNITED STATES GENERAL 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on 
Government Reform, House of Representatives, (Nov. 2002), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03272.pdf (providing information on 
coordination of federal efforts to combat child pornography). 
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Finally, the government should take steps to inform both 
parents and children about child pornography so that both are 
encouraged to report offenses more extensively.226 “Computer 
telecommunications have become one of the most prevalent 
techniques used by pedophiles to share illegal photographic images 
of minors and to lure children into illicit sexual relationships.”227 
According to the National Center for Missing and Exploited 
Children, children who view child pornography begin to view 
pornographic acts as acceptable and normal.228 This acceptance 
may decrease the likelihood that they will report such offenses.229 
If children are made more knowledgeable about what it means to 
be solicited on the Internet, they will more likely speak up about 
such incidents.230 In the same respect, if parents are made more 
knowledgeable about federal and state laws regarding the 
definitions and criminal implications of child pornography, they 
will more likely be responsive to the issue and report such offenses 
to the appropriate authorities.231 
                                                          
226 See infra note 230 and accompanying text. 
227 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, ONLINE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY: 
INNOCENT IMAGES NATIONAL INITIATIVE, at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/cac/ 
innocent.htm (last visited, Oct. 30, 2003). 
228 NATIONAL CENTER FOR MISSING AND EXPLOITED CHILDREN, Child 
Pornography Background, at http://www.missingkids.com/missingkids/servlet 
/PageServlet?LanguageCountry=en_US&PageID=1198 (last visited Oct. 30, 
2003). 
229 Statistics have yet to be released to illustrate the decline in the number 
of successful prosecutions after the CPPA’s ban on virtual child pornography 
was overturned. 
230 NATIONAL CENTER FOR MISSING AND EXPLOITED CHILDREN, Campaign 
Against Child Sexual Exploitation, at http://www.missingkids.com/missingkids/ 
servlet/CampaignServlet?LanguageCountry=en_US&PageId= 1246 (last visited 
Jan. 9, 2004). One of the campaign’s messages states: “The Sound A Child 
Makes When Sexually Assaulted is Usually Silence.” The campaign encourages 
parents to be proactive in detecting and preventing child sexual exploitation and 
in educating their children about sexual exploitation in order to encourage 
reporting of such offenses. 
231 Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is too soon to determine the extent virtual child pornography 
will affect the government’s ability to prosecute child pornography 
offenders. Unfortunately, the scenario envisioned by prosecutors, 
in which a defendant in possession of child pornography can 
escape liability by asserting that the government must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the images they possess, create or 
distribute are derived from real children, is already a reality.232 The 
fact remains, however, that the Supreme Court has stated that child 
pornography may be proscribed only where a real child is involved 
and where the welfare of real children is primarily in the 
balance.233 The COPPA of 2002 and 2003 and the ban on virtual 
child pornography in the PROTECT ACT suffer from a fatal flaw 
in that their prohibitions on virtual child pornography do not solely 
implicate real children.234 As such, Congress faces the tremendous 
and arguably insurmountable obstacle of tailoring virtual child 
pornography laws to meet constitutional standards. Particularly in 
light of the problems in the numerous statutes enacted over the last 
decade, Congress should focus its resources on alternative viable 
solutions to the problems created by virtual child pornography in 
order to strengthen the case against offenders of actual child 
pornography. 
 
                                                          
232 See supra Part III (pointing to cases in which prosecutors are having 
difficulty prosecuting cases where defendants assert that the images they 
allegedly possessed or distributed did not implicate real children). 
233 See supra Part II (discussing the Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition 
decision and its implications with respect to virtual child pornography laws). 
234 See supra Part IV (analyzing the constitutionality of these recent 
legislative attempts). 
